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
RY INSTITUTIONS OF CANADA

BY

GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B., D.S.O.,

Inspector General of the Oversea Forces

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OTTAWA
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
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REPORT
ON THE
MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF CANADA

BY
GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B., D.S.O.,
Inspector General of the Oversea Forces

1913

"AT SEA,"

R.M.S. "EMPRESS OF IRELAND,"

July 30, 1913.

From The Inspector General of the Oversea Forces,
To the Honourable
The Minister of Militia and Defence,
Canada.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose my report upon the inspections I have carried out at the request of the Dominion Government.

In doing so, I am quite at a loss as to how to find expression for my sense of obligations and kindnesses innumerable received. You, Sir, have devoted weeks of your time, as well as trouble simply endless, to the task of making my visit a success. Exclusive of ground covered in motor cars and on horseback, we have travelled together some 13,957 miles and have inspected 112 units of Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery. If I fail now to help you, the fault can only be my own, especially as you have left me an entirely free pen, and have never, by word, act or hint of any kind, endeavoured to influence this purely personal document. As to the Canadian forces with whom it has been my happy privilege to come in contact, I can only thank them with all my heart for the welcome they have everywhere extended to me and to my Staff, and for the spirit in which any suggestions of mine have invariably been received.

A separate report will in due course be submitted dealing with the defences and fortresses of Canada.

No proposals have been put forward regarding the organization and distribution of duties at Militia Headquarters at Ottawa. The omission is intentional. I am anxious to complete my tour of the self-governing Dominions of the Empire before I attempt to discuss a subject so important and contentious as headquarter organization. Within twelve months I hope to be able to submit a memorandum dealing with this matter to all the Nations of the Empire which have done me the honour to ask me to inspect their military forces.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

IAN HAMILTON, *General*,
Inspector General of the Oversea Forces.

I. EXPLANATORY PREFACE.

PREVIOUS INSPECTIONS.

1. I feel as if the past three years of my life had been spent in training myself for my visit to Canada. Continuously, during that time, I have been inspecting and taking stock of imperial fortresses and territories, reporting upon the local troops raised by the various Crown Colonies and Dependencies, or reviewing the efficiency of the military forces and seaward defences of the Union of South Africa.

Thus it comes that my purview of Empire now embraces such widely varying categories as Voluntary Service Cadets; Compulsory Service Cadets; Boy Scouts black, white and yellow; members of Volunteer Rifle Clubs drawn from the outlying homesteads of Rhodesia; Military Reservists of Natal, organized but untrained; paid and unpaid Militiamen, and volunteers of all arms and of varying degrees of efficiency; Mounted Police, in everything but name professional soldiers; and, finally, the Regulars themselves.

PURPOSE OF INSPECTION.

2. To all these military types I have made it my practice to apply the following tests:—

First, I endeavour (not always with success) to ascertain what purpose each one in its own degree is intended to serve;

Secondly, I consider whether, in sufficiency and efficiency, it serves that purpose;

Thirdly, I do my best to determine whether it is organized, commanded, trained, and administered in such a way that full value is received for the money spent on it;

Fourthly, I decide whether the type is in harmony with a principle applicable to the Empire as a whole.

I propose now to apply similar tests to the military forces of this Dominion, and to apply them with unflinching candour. For I make bold to consider the invitation of the Honourable the Minister for Militia and Defence as in itself constituting an assurance that he expects nothing less of me than the whole naked truth. He, I feel certain, will understand the spirit in which I propose to overhaul his defence machine.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

3. But others may not equally appreciate my point of view. In old days, the gold digger of the Cariboo district would not spare one moment from his labours to heed those who told him that desperadoes from across the border were waiting on the trail away back through the Rockies to relieve him of his pile. So too, to-day, military preoccupations concerning problematical dangers sit lightly on men immersed in an absorbing daily struggle for fortune, conducted under the immunity from fear afforded by the imperial forces.

To such men I would like to say at the outset that I shall try all the time to remember that they are extraordinarily busy people who have better reasons than most for believing they have no time to devote to practical soldiering. I shall not permit myself to forget that their country still lies outside the sphere of the heavily armed European nations, or that estimates for naval and military purposes must always, before getting home, run the gauntlet of a remorseless Finance Department, whose business it is to skin them as bare as it can. I realize, in short, that to aim too high is quite the surest method of wasting powder and shot, and so my wish throughout this report will be to be practical and in no case to exaggerate either actual weakness or potential dangers.

II. THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF CANADA.

WAR ORGANIZATION.

4. The Canadian Army is organized for war as follows:—

Field Army—

- 7 Mounted Brigades.
- 6 Divisions.
- 3 Mixed Brigades.
- Lines of Communication Units.

Garrison Troops—

Required for Halifax, Quebec and Esquimalt.

UNITS DEFICIENT.

5. The units which have yet to be formed in order to complete the war organization are shown in detail in Appendix B.

The most serious deficiencies are the following:—

- 48 Batteries of artillery.
- 34 Ammunition columns.
- 8 Field troops and companies, engineers.
- 2 Infantry battalions (one in 5th, one in 6th Division).
- 11 Telegraph and wireless detachments.
- 15 Companies Army Service Corps.
- 7 Field ambulances.

NUMBERS REQUIRED.

6. In round numbers (see Appendix C) the requirements of the war organization are:—

	Officers.	Other Ranks.
Field Army.....	5,500	143,000
Garrison Troops.....	400	10,000
Total.....	5,900	153,000

NUMBERS AVAILABLE.

7. To meet these requirements the number of officers and men (less 5 per cent) who were present with the colours in 1912, and received some sort of military training was approximately:—

	Officers.	Other Ranks.
Permanent Force.....	250	2,500
Active Militia.....	3,550	40,500
Total.....	3,800	43,000

If, therefore, mobilization of the Canadian Army had been ordered last year, it would have been necessary to find, at short notice, some 2,100 officers and 110,000 other ranks from sources outside the Militia forces of the country in order to complete the field army and garrison troops to the war establishment duly sanctioned by Parliament.

DEPOT CADRES.

8. The army possessing no system for its maintenance in the field is like an elephant that has lost its trunk. It starves amidst plenty. All the millions of people in the United Kingdom could not keep the cadres of the small Crimean Army up to strength because there was no feeding organization in existence. Depot cadres are an indispensable additional adjunct to every field army which is conducted on business principles. A depot establishment calculated at the rate of 50 per cent of the field army is usually taken as the minimum. Two thousand eight hundred officers and over 70,000 other ranks should, therefore, be added to the deficit shown in the previous paragraph, bringing the total to be met on mobilization from outside sources to 4,900 officers and more than 180,000 other ranks.

THE RESERVE MILITIA.

9. Under Section 10 of the Militia Act, the whole manhood of the nation between the ages of 18 and 60 is "available for service in the Militia." The rapidly expanding population of Canada stands already at over seven and a half millions, of whom it may be assumed that about one million males are in all respects fit for active service. This number, less the Active Militia, forms the Reserve Militia of the country, for which no sort of military organization at present exists. The custom of keeping up muster rolls of those liable for service which obtained until comparatively recently is now in abeyance.

HORSES AND MECHANICAL TRANSPORT.

10. Approximately 29,000 riding horses and 26,000 draught and pack animals would be needed for the field army alone. In Canada there are in all some 2,400,000 horses of sorts, of which about 20 per cent, or rather less than half a million, are believed to be suitable for military purposes. Under the Militia Act the number required can be taken under requisition. Owing to the expense entailed, little has yet been done towards inspecting and registering the horses of the country. Nor have any steps been taken towards classifying motor cars and motor lorries.

ARMS, AMMUNITION, CLOTHING, STORES, ETC.

11. The relation between stocks on hand and stocks required on mobilization is shown in Appendix D. The most serious deficiencies are as follows:

284 guns and howitzers for the field army; (60 are under order.)

Ammunition for the same.

287 machine guns; 50 under order.

97,000 rifles; 13,500 on order.

140 million rounds of small arm ammunition.

150,000 suits of service dress.

100,000 sets of web equipment.

150,000 entrenching implements.

A large amount of harness (of regulation pattern), as well as saddlery, would also be wanted for use with guns and technical vehicles.

TRAINING.

12. The training of the Permanent Force is carried out continuously throughout the year. In the Active Militia, officers and men in city corps can draw pay for 16 days annually, of which at least four days must be spent in camp; twelve days' training at headquarters qualifies for efficiency. In rural corps the whole training of the year, including musketry, is carried out during 12 days in camp. All artillery units train for 16 days.

EDUCATION AND INSTRUCTION.

13. Educational tests for the Permanent Force are the same as for the Regular Army.

The Active Militia is instructed by the following professional staff:—

	Officers.	Other Ranks.
Cavalry	4	33
Artillery	4	16
Engineers	1	5
Infantry	8	82
Total	17	136

Students are taught at schools established with detachments of the Permanent Force, or else at provisional schools set up from time to time in convenient centres. The Royal Military College at Kingston produces annually some 40 graduates, who are commissioned to the Regular Army, the Permanent Force or the Active Militia.

A staff course is held annually at Kingston for the benefit of Militia officers.

Musketry is taught at the Rockcliffe School and at provincial schools, and signalling instruction is provided by means of provisional schools held throughout Canada.

Officers Training Corps have recently been established at Canadian Universities, their object being the instruction of students in military theory and practice.

Military Institutes at Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg are recognized by the Militia Department. Lectures are given and war games are held at these institutes during the winter months.

LIABILITY FOR SERVICE.

14. "The Governor in Council may place the Militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of emergency." (Militia Act, Section 69.)

The liability of the Canadian military forces is strictly territorial. Not an officer or man, either permanent or non-permanent, can, in his capacity as a Canadian militiaman, volunteer for service overseas either in peace or in war.

MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY INSTITUTIONS.

15. *Cadets*.—The present cadet organization is of recent date. Organizers and Inspectors of Cadet Corps were appointed to Divisions and Districts in May, 1912, and a Director of Cadet Services to the Headquarters Staff, Ottawa, in December, 1912. Summer camps were instituted in 1912.

There are at the present time 844 cadet squadrons and companies, with a membership of approximately 33,700 cadets. Some 300 companies have been formed since June 1, 1912. Courses for training cadet instructors are held periodically at the Military Schools of Instruction and are well attended.

Instruction in Physical Training.—The Militia Department undertakes the training of Physical Training Directors, both male and female, who in their turn instruct school teachers with a view to their obtaining physical training certificates. Nearly 3,000 school teachers, male and female, obtained certificates between July 1, 1911, and June 30, 1912. Some portion of the cost of this physical instruction comes from trust funds set aside by Lord Strathcona for the purpose.

Rifle Clubs.—To entitle them to receive aid from public funds, civilian rifle clubs and associations must be subject to the control of the Militia Department. Members of these clubs do no military training. There are 432 civilian rifle clubs with a membership of about 25,000. Authorized clubs are entitled to a certain number of Government rifles on loan, as well as 100 rounds of ammunition annually for each member.

Voluntary Aid Detachments.—The organization of Voluntary Medical Aid in Canada was approved by the Militia Council in November, 1911, and instructions on the subject were issued. The work has been undertaken by the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which has already formed 15 ambulance divisions and 3 nursing divisions. The units produced by this Voluntary Aid system are hardly yet in a position to render effective assistance on active service.

The Canadian Red Cross Society is willing to place its organization at the disposal of the military authorities in time of war.

Various Associations.—The Dominion Rifle Association, the Provincial Rifle Associations, the Canadian Rifle League and the Canadian Artillery Association do much to encourage rifle shooting and gun practice.

They are recognized by the Militia Department and receive from it small grants in aid.

NUMBERS TRAINED.

16. The following figures are of interest as showing what the tendency has been during the past 10 years.

Year.	Strength of Permanent Force (including Instructional Staff).	Number of Active Militiamen trained.
1903.....	868	25,990
1904.....	1,079	35,674
1905.....	2,101	39,492
1906.....	2,593	40,800
1907.....	2,942	40,753
1908.....	3,120	43,042
1909.....	2,833	36,224
1910.....	2,820	43,394
1911.....	3,021	42,452
1912.....	3,121	45,860

The increase to the Permanent Force in 1905 and 1906 was due to the relief of the Imperial garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt by Canadian troops.

Of the increase of 2,253 officers and men in the Permanent Force since 1903, 1,000 are for Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army Medical Corps, and other administrative corps, marking the process of consolidating a number of heterogeneous corps into a real Army.

III. PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE MILITARY FORCES OF CANADA EXIST.

OBJECTS OF MAINTAINING AN ARMY.

17. In every State, national policy is reflected faithfully enough in the constitution of its military forces. Armies may be divided into three categories; the army organized primarily to carry war into foreign territory; the army organized purely for passive home defence; and the army organized, primarily to defend its own territories, secondarily to stretch out a helping hand to its friends. The first signifies the will to expand—aggression. The second signifies either undeveloped power—immaturity, or arrested development—decadence. The third signifies the will to maintain—Empire.

HOME DEFENCE THE FIRST DUTY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES.

18. The primary duty of every self-governing portion of Greater Britain is to make all reasonable provision. *up to the limit of its resources*, for defence against

invasion of its own territories. If it fails and relies rather upon its brethren overseas than upon its own right arm, it is unworthy of its independence. A self-governing State cannot afford, whilst retaining its self-respect, to count upon the services of expeditionary troops drawn from other portions of the Empire, until it has taken such measures for home defence as would be considered reasonable did it stand alone in the world. In short, naval considerations apart, a sound system of imperial defence must rest, in its widest aspects, on the ability of each self-governing Dominion to offer a vigorous resistance to any attempts made against the integrity of its own home territories.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE CANNOT BE NEGLECTED.

19. But, as the whole is greater than its part, so the Empire is morally and materially greater than any component thereof. The very existence of that vast organism, Greater Britain, depends on its sea power coupled with the ubiquity of its land forces. Unless, therefore, the true relation of local defence to imperial defence can be made clear to the citizens of the whole Empire, errors in military policy are bound to arise and disaster will follow; the knot binding the bundle of fagots will be unloosened and those who, united, could have stood against a world in arms will succumb, when divided, to forces despicable if only they are fairly reckoned up and faced.

I take it as an axiom then that every State in the Empire is bound in honour, after looking to its own immediate safety, to consider how it may best take its share in the general burden of responsibility. Just as the presence of a stamp makes all the difference in a promise to meet a monetary obligation, so a mere handful of men pledged to defend Greater Britain wherever it may be attacked, transforms Empire from a pompous and perhaps misleading term into a serious and formidable fact.

FARSIGHTED POLICY NECESSARY WHERE MILITARY PREPARATIONS ARE CONCERNED.

20. Turning now to Canada and to what has just been described as a primary duty—do her existing military forces and defences in themselves constitute a reasonably sufficient safeguard against dangers which may confront her in the pursuit of her State policy? The power of potential adversaries can only be weighed and discussed in secret. In my present capacity all I feel myself called upon to do is to indicate the military value of the existing Dominion forces. Also to say frankly where I think improvements might be introduced in case the conscience of the Canadian people should now, or at any future time, warn them that they are taking a less broad, farsighted and generous view of their military obligations than their descendants might some day wish them to have entertained. For neither the organization nor the qualities requisite for a sound system of national defence can be improvised in the throes of an emergency. Therefore, it can never be safe for a State to regard its military forces from the standpoint of present day requirements alone. Those forces must grow with the nation's growth and become a very part of its being.

THE CALL OF THE FUTURE.

21. However secure Canada may feel herself for the fleeting moment, even she, happily situated as she may seem to be, will hardly care to stake her existence on the assumption that dangers, now vague and remote in their seeming, will never unexpectedly leap on to the forefront of the platform of her national life. Immense forces, some of them mortal enemies to all our most cherished conceptions of life, are now stirring in Europe, Asia and in the New World itself. Unless, in our vast Empire, insurance keeps some sort of business relation to income, our descendants will have to make bitter application of the lines:

"A thousand years scarce serve to form a State,
"An hour may lay it in the dust."

Memories of surpassing glory lie behind the great Dominion. From such memories will assuredly spring more noble ambitions than can be satisfied by wringing the uttermost out of the present. To the ears of any Canadian who pauses for a moment to listen, comes the call of the future telling him to build his foundations very broad and deep, so that hereafter the palaces of his children's children may rise thereon in security and splendour.

OFFENSIVE ACTION THE EMPIRE'S TRUE POLICY.

22. Except in rare moments of weakness, misrule and depression, the Mother Country has always placed offensive oversea action far above local defence. Always, with rare exceptions, she has played a bold game and organized to attack any one who meddled with her children. Now that the children have come of age it is their turn to understand that local defence is but a part of the imperial problem which faces our five confederated nations, and that such preparations are merely an act of insurance against failure on the part of the naval and military forces of the Empire to co-operate for offensive action whenever and wherever in the world they may be required. An unbiased observer* has indeed ventured the opinion that "In an Empire so constituted as that of the British, an army of home defence becomes an army of imperial destruction." "British military preparation," he goes on to say, "and the organization of every unit constituting its military force, whether in the United Kingdom, Australia**, Canada, South Africa, or its colonies, must be subject to and governed by those principles that determine the character of an expeditionary force." Without going so far as our American critic it may at least be claimed that, whereas, for most portions of the Empire, our supreme navy may still make invasion seem a very far away contingency, yet the call for co-operation overseas is, humanly speaking, certain to arise before many more years pass over our heads.

THE LESSON OF SOUTH AFRICA.

23. Experience in Egypt in 1885, and again in South Africa, 1899-1902, has demonstrated to the world that, given the necessity, every portion of the Empire is anxious, in war, to take its share in supporting the imperial burden. So far, however, that experience has failed to bear the practical fruit of organization by Dominion governments in peace to carry out effectively what they have every reason to be certain will be the will of their people in war. South Africa proved up to the hilt the extravagance and weakness of improvised methods. It proved the necessity of an imperial instrument for war, of which the parts, gathered from all quarters of the globe, would readily fit together and work without friction from the start. It proved that the conception of a homogeneous united army of Greater Britain is unattainable except at the cost of infinite thought and perseverance in preparation.

CANADA'S PROBLEMS.

24. I have deemed it necessary to state thus briefly certain elementary principles of imperial defence as, till these are thoroughly grasped not only by the statesmen but by the people of the Five Nations, evolution of military policy on sound lines is impossible.

The organization of the Canadian Army and its preparation and training for war should be governed wholly by the purpose, or purposes, it is intended to serve in war. This is a truism perhaps, but it is a truism that ought to be shouted down the corridors of War Offices on the days when army estimates are being prepared for the edification of parliaments. Home defence comes first, and the chief military problem for which Canada has to find a solution is how to organize her manhood so as to give

* *The Day of the Saxon* by Homer Lea, published in 1912.

**Should have read "Australasia", or else New Zealand should have been included.

herself a reasonable security against invasion. That done, may she be inspired to think of the thousands from overseas who would fight, on land and sea, in her behalf were she attacked to-morrow, and prepare herself, according to her means, to do as much for them in return.

IV. THE NATION ORGANIZED FOR WAR.

THE RESERVE MILITIA.

25. Certain elements of Canadian defence are as yet embryonic. I begin with the Reserve Militia, and I am bound to point out that, so long as Clause 10 of the Militia Act remains a dead letter, the real National Army of Canada is, not only practically but, what is worse, morally, in a state of suspended animation. Under the existing law all male citizens between 18 and 60—actually some 1,000,000 effectives—are supposed to be available by enrolment and ballot for the defence of the country. When the war organization now contemplated is complete, machinery will exist for absorbing just 160,000 out of the million aforesaid. But there are no reserve cadres, nor is there machinery for replacing the ugly gaps war will very quickly make in the ranks.* Under the law, as I have said, the whole manhood of the Dominion is theoretically available to fill cadres which may lose 70 per cent. of their effectives during the first year's campaigning. But the very generosity of the proviso causes it, coupled as it is with complete vagueness as to ways and means, to become practically nugatory.

APPLICATION OF THE EXISTING LAW.

26. Mere *levée en masse* clauses such as this or the corresponding ballot clauses of the British Militia Act, are curses in disguise. They can be served out as soothing syrup for reformers, and that is positively the only use either Act is put to now. I doubt if one in a hundred of the young men in the West are even aware of their liabilities under the Act. But, under a democracy, a latent law which has not for the past generation run the gauntlet of public opinion, is no law. It carries no moral obligation home to the conscience of the individual. It cannot be sprung upon him at the last moment. If Clause 10 were applicable to one-half of the manhood of Canada instead of to the whole of it, and were that half duly entered on muster rolls and warned of their liabilities, there would be bite as well as bark in the proviso. Then, at least, a seriously meant enactment would serve as a deterrent to ill-wishers and, at the same time, it would keep awake in the minds of the people a sense of their personal obligations to the State. As it is, there is no heart in the Act; it rings hollow; and so it comes that, in my humble opinion, Canada to-day is certainly not making provision *up to the limit of her resources* for her own defence.

PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE.

27. Assuming now that the people of the Dominion have an eye to the future and are genuinely anxious to build up their scheme of defence on a broad national foundation, the first step (and it is the first step, we are told, that counts) can be taken without effort. No change in the existing law is necessary. All that need be done is to revive the old French and British custom—a custom as old as Canada itself—of preparing in peace military muster rolls of the men actually liable. The next step would be to instruct the military authorities to base their schemes of war organization for home defence upon these muster rolls. There, for the present—perhaps forever—the matter would rest. From the financial or business point of view, such

* The 2nd Bn. Royal Canadian Regiment when it marched into Pretoria with my column numbered 438 effectives of all ranks. Six months previously it had landed in South Africa 1,150 strong.

measures would amount merely to an explicit declaration on the part of Canada that, in the event of aggression a real National Army would emerge from the farmsteads and factories of the Dominion, infinitely more quickly, more effectively, and more economically, than would be possible at present. From the point of view of the potential enemy it would mean less temptation to his General Staff to dwell upon schemes of invasion.

The man who wishes to cook a hare must first catch it. The gap between the prairie and the larder needs some bridging. A nation desiring to train men to meet an emergency must be able to lay its fingers on them, each man to his place, at short notice. Dull folk are incapable of conceiving something latent, something organized, but yet not in being. When they swallow their hare soup, processes of the catching and the cooking are as much confounded in their minds as is the soup in their stomachs! They see no use in making sure of the men unless those men are to be trained forthwith. They seem to find it almost impossible to grasp that the first and most essential part of army-making consists in having the men told off in advance to the dépôts of each corps and department which it may be desired to reinforce, expand or create. They refuse to think about the hare. Their thoughts are entirely absorbed by the soup. So, when want knocks at the door, they will go hungry!

SOME ORGANIZATION NECESSARY FOR THE RESERVE MILITIA.

28. A paper organization telling off the men to their places will cost nothing beyond the trifling expenses connected with the preparation of the necessary service rosters, nor will it take any toll of the energies of the youth of the country during peace. But such organization would evince a real practical intention on the part of the Dominion Government—an intention which should have the happiest result upon the frame of mind of their own people and upon the disposition of any potential enemy.

The whole problem of the sufficiency or otherwise of the Canadian military forces for purposes of home defence, hinges on this question of giving some practical meaning and organization to the great formless mass of the Reserve Militia, of whom, as I have said, the vast majority are not even aware of the fact that they are legally liable to fight in the last resort.

RESULTS OF ORGANIZING.

29. The moment it is quite clearly and unmistakeably realized that the defence of the country rests in the final extremity with the nation itself, many things now obscure stand revealed in a new light. Thus, the primary purpose of the Active Militia, which is to act as a military training school, is no longer concealed. The great educative work that force is doing in peace, will for the first time be appreciated by the nation at its true value. Cadet training too will gain enormously in significance. For every boy will be able to conceive much more fully than at present the full scope of his citizenship. Now, in fact, by learning his lessons he is only preparing himself to hold his own against his fellow countrymen, whereas, by fulfilling his duties as a cadet, he is preparing himself to stand by and help them in their hour of need.

If then, Canadians are desirous, without effort and at trifling cost, to give their plan of defence real meaning in the minds of the people—in effect to increase its value out of all knowledge—I would urge them to organize the Reserve Militia on a practical basis.

OBJECTIONS LIKELY TO BE RAISED.

30. Two objections, and two only, can I conceive as likely to be raised.

First, it may be argued that Great Britain has hitherto failed to organize for war under the ballot clauses of her own ancient, but still valid, Militia Act. My response

is, simply, that two blacks do not make a white. Were it possible to put old heads on young shoulders the world would progress more slowly than a snail. 'Inspiration must come from London,' is a phrase I have heard as far west as Vancouver. The modesty of such an attitude is its only merit. Youth no longer follows age in these modern times. Adaptability to new fashions has not hitherto been reckoned as one amongst the numerous virtues of a grandmother. Let Canada lead. In due course, England will cautiously follow.

Secondly, it may perhaps be hinted that, in advocating organization on the basis of universal service in war, I am striving to work in the thin edge of the wedge for universal training in peace.

MANHOOD TRAINING IN PEACE NOT INTENDED.

31. My personal views on this subject have been published in the *Old Country*, but as they may be unknown out here, I venture briefly to repeat them.

In so far as the defence of the Empire depends on sea power, which carries with it oversea liabilities as a *sine qua non* for its land forces, voluntary service and all it stands for must be upheld by all possible means. No more ardent supporter of the voluntary principle exists than myself. But I am not on that account under any delusion as to its limitations wherever home defence is concerned, and I hold, therefore, that over and above an effective system of voluntary training, some further insurance is essential, whether to provide against a possible failure of sea power, or as a safeguard whenever or wherever sea power may become inoperative. Adequate boy training *plus* scientific organization based on citizen service is the price that every part of the Empire should pay for such insurance. But, I wish to repeat here, emphatically, my opinion that practical recognition of the principle that every citizen's services should be placed at his country's disposal in war, does not necessarily entail a system of universal manhood training in peace.

BOY TRAINING NECESSARY.

32. I have now given my reasons for thinking that, no matter how efficient the Active Militia may become, nothing less than a national organization can create a force formidable enough to drive the very idea of invasion out of the heads of ill-wishers. And, although in my opinion it would be waste of strength and energy to supplement this organization at present by manhood training, yet, to fulfil its purpose effectively, it must be founded on boy training. Unless, in fact, the system of boy training already existing in the country is likely in time to become so universal and so thorough as to serve as a partial substitute for universal manhood training, I fear that my views may have been too optimistic. Discipline; camaraderie; the sense of duty of citizen to fellow-citizen; and some elementary knowledge of handling arms and of drill can all be acquired at school, and are actually, in rapidly increasing degree, in process of being acquired in many Canadian schools. The spread of this voluntary movement is indeed a very wonderful portent, and one for which prayers of thanksgiving might well be put up in all the churches of all denominations in the land. If it continues at the present rate then, I feel confident, all the outside dangers of the future will solve themselves quite simply as they arise. But if the movement should, from any cause, hang fire, then I should like to see Canada emulate Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in frankly adopting compulsory training for all youths up to the age of 18. In Natal, where such a system has existed for some 20 years past, the results, whether judged from a moral, a physical or a military standpoint, are perfectly splendid, as I was able to convince myself after a searching inspection made on the spot some 18 months ago.

CANADIAN VIEWS ON BOY TRAINING.

33. Fortunately it is unnecessary for me further to air my own ideas as to the national advantages of cadet training. Those views are stated, very much better than I could state them, in a pamphlet* recently issued by the heads of the universities, high educational authorities, as well as some of the foremost leaders of religious thought in Canada, and here they are:—

“ . . . There are men who attack those who advocate cadet work in the schools, and who charge them with approving of ‘conscription.’ This charge has absolutely no foundation. The cadet system is a rational substitute for conscription. It avoids all the evils of conscription, and it develops the best elements of human power and character, while at the same time it secures all the supposed advantages of conscription in the most natural and the most thoroughly effective way. . . . There is no logical basis for good citizenship but the one that recognizes a man’s duties to his country. There is no proper system of training in citizenship that does not make all children—girls as well as boys—conscious of their responsibilities as individual units in their country. Boys should understand that they will become responsible for the defence of their homes and their country when they reach the age of 18. They should be trained to use their influence to avoid war; but the fundamental principle is that they are liable by law to give their services to defend their country when necessary in return for the privileges they enjoy as citizens.

“It is an indefensible moral ideal that a man should enjoy the many rights of citizenship without recognizing his responsibility for the duties of citizenship. . . . Universal liability for defence service is unquestionably right.”

Whatever form cadet training in Canada may take, these words convey the conviction that the rich and beautiful Dominion, with its traditions of warlike glory and aspirations towards a wonderful future, possesses wise and far-sighted counsellors who understand that as the boy is father to the man, so is the cadet company parent to a united brotherly country.

VETERAN ASSOCIATIONS.

34. At various places during my tour of inspection, notably at Winnipeg, I had the privilege of shaking hands with members of various Veteran Associations. There is nothing in the whole series of delightful happenings in Canada to which I shall look back with warmer sentiments than such meetings. These fine old soldiers, wearing on their breasts war medals for service in Canada, and in many famous campaigns fought all over the globe, help to give a tone of imperial sentiment to the West, and the romantic associations they personify make a powerful appeal to the more generous minded of the young immigrants pouring into the country. I have met many old comrades among these veterans, and I welcome the opportunity of telling them, one and all, how my heart has gone out to them and how I have realized what their presence on parade must mean as a source of inspiration to the troops and cadets having the honour to stand there alongside them.

A NATIONAL RESERVE PROPOSED.

35. But the veterans, though they may embody old traditions which, but for them, would soon be wholly forgotten, are yet, I am glad to say, themselves very much alive; many of them indeed are exceptionally vigorous. They are not yet, like a gallery of ancestral portraits, good for nothing more practical than to make their descendants try and live up to their standards. They can still handle a rifle. In the United King-

* *The Cadet System in Schools*, a pamphlet signed by the following:—Chancellor of Victoria University, Toronto; Vice Chancellor, Queen’s University, Kingston; Vice Rector, Laval University, Montreal; Principal, University College, Toronto; Superintendent of Education, Nova Scotia; Chief Inspector of Schools, Toronto; and others.

dom, account has quite recently been taken of this element in the population, and the Veteran Associations of the Regular and Territorial Armies have been formed into a National Reserve. This force is open to every officer and man who has rendered efficient naval or military service to the State. Its existence is recognized by the military authorities and by all State and municipal bodies. At official ceremonies, its members are accorded special privileges in their corporate capacity. The National Reserve is organized on a county basis, with branches in every town and borough, and is managed mainly through the instrumentality of its own members, practically without cost to the State, a sum equivalent to 25 cents per head being all that is paid by the Government for organizing expenses. Membership entails no military liability and uniform is not required. But it is quite certain that at a word the whole force would put themselves at the disposal of the authorities to act as Home Guards. Badges approved by the King may be worn, and rifle clubs formed by National Reservists are accorded certain privileges. Such, in broad outline, are the main features of the National Reserve of the United Kingdom, which, initiated rather more than two years ago, numbers to-day some 200,000 members. By a stroke of the pen, just a mere stroke of the pen, Canada could embody 50,000 tried warriors right away and, apart from all other advantages, the inducement thus held out to the Active Militiaman to complete his three years of service and qualify as a National Reservist*, would alone be worth ten times the trifling trouble and expense.

V. THE ACTIVE MILITIA.

ITS PURPOSES.

36. The Active Militia serves the double purpose of a training school for the nation in peace and of a first line of defence in war.

From the educative point of view alone, the appeal made by this force to all the higher attributes of Canadian manhood has meant more than can well be measured by words. Year in, year out, the Active Militia has served as a reservoir to sentiments vital to national safety—loyalty to Canada, collective discipline, subordination of the self-seeking instinct to the loftier call for public duty. Year in, year out, the young generations have perseveringly sacrificed cash and holidays in seeking to develop the more distinctively martial qualities—capacity in leaders; loyalty in subordinates; *esprit de corps* in units; skill-at-arms amongst individuals. All these things have come, and can only come as the result of steady military endeavour continued through generations of national life. Without them national decadence is assured. Every individual in Canada who has given, or is giving, faithful service in the Active Militia is thereby performing something generous and altruistic; something of supreme importance to the well-being of his country.

ITS SPIRIT.

37. If my inspection has persuaded me of one thing more than another it is that the great majority of those now serving do so from a sense of duty, and that they fully appreciate how much the good name of the Militia generally, and of their own units in particular, depends on their individual conduct. At all my inspections, whether in drill halls and on city parade grounds or during operations in the field, the keenness of the officers has only been equalled by that of the rank and file. The discipline of the camps has been admirable. There was no room in their moral atmosphere for the idea of indiscipline to assert itself. The laying out of the lines and their cleanliness have, as a rule, been beyond reproach. The spirit in which all ranks

* Corps reserves could quite appropriately be formed as part of the National Reserve. No Militiaman should be regarded as eligible for the National or a Corps Reserve who has not completed three years' efficient service.

have accepted the rule prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors shows a respect for duly constituted authority with which the people of the New World have not always been credited.

ITS TRAINING.

38. Goodwill then—nay enthusiasm—may be taken for granted. No army has ever accomplished great deeds without these qualities. But military history also records many instances proving that, valuable as a fine impulse may be, it is apt to be shattered to pieces if brought against the much more commonplace force produced by businesslike organization and patient training. I propose, therefore, to deal with the training and organization of the units of the Active Militia and, afterwards, to discuss how far either is likely to stand the test of war.

First I take up the matter of training. A sound system of training, like a good organization, must be built up systematically from the bottom. In modern armies it is progressive throughout the year. Individual training is followed by training in the troop or section; then come squadron and company training; and so on, through the regiment or battalion, the brigade, the division, up to the highest war formation such as the army corps or the army. If all the companies of a brigade of infantry are thoroughly well trained in attack and defence by day or night, in protective services and in musketry, then the brigade, put into the hands of a capable brigadier, becomes at once a valuable instrument for war, even if it may suffer a while from want of cohesion and from lack of confidence between one company and another. But if the companies are not well grounded in their duties, then, though the brigade work together under favourable circumstances for weeks, the instrument is liable to snap in the commander's hand when the hour of trial is upon it.

INDIVIDUAL AND ELEMENTARY TRAINING.

39. The instruction of the individual in military exercises and musketry, and his confidence in his chief instructor, his captain, lie at the root of all military efficiency. No amount of tactical training in the battalion or brigade, or during field operations, will compensate for lack of company work. If the training of the individual soldier is faulty or deficient, and if the men generally have not reliance in and respect for their captains, then the government dependent on such an army will be well advised to arbitrate its disputes, even if its records in that connection are as disastrous as those of Canada have hitherto been.

In most countries where a militia system is adopted, in Switzerland for example, a sharp line of distinction is drawn between the training of the individual, of sections, and of the squadron or company on the one hand, and the higher tactical training of battalions, brigades and divisions on the other. Recruit training and the training of recruits grouped into companies and squadrons, is carried out by several weeks of continuous work in central schools. The detail side of training having thus been mastered, the greater portion of the 16 days' annual embodied training can subsequently be devoted to field manœuvres, where the instruction of the larger unities is the main object.

TRAINING OF CITY CORPS.

40. In Canadian city corps the same discrimination is to a large extent actually being observed, and recruit, squadron and company training is more or less continuous throughout the year, so that, however short the time in camp may be, the best part of it can usually be devoted to field work. Moreover, the efficiency of a city corps is clearly affected to a large extent by such factors as fine drill halls; convenient rifle ranges for both service and miniature rifles; provision of subtargets; presence of good instructors; and by the existence, somewhere in the neighbourhood, of a site where week-end camps can be held.

Taking then into consideration the high type of intelligence and physique which characterizes most city corps, the 16 days' training, officially recognized, may be held to satisfy (though only as a bare minimum) the demands that may be made upon them in war. I have spoken of this training as being a bare minimum, and I strongly urge therefore that it continue to be supplemented by as much voluntary work as possible, carried out on the range, in the drill hall, and in the class room. If the rank and file continue to take a generous view of their contract with the State, and will endeavour to make the necessary sacrifice to attend the annual camp; if also employers of labour will recognize and realize what the efficiency of the Active Militia means to the country, then I have no hesitation in saying that all city corps will before long be in a position, as many of them are now, to make a name for themselves if ever they are given the chance.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTIVE MILITIA.

41. In inspecting city corps I felt myself travelling over very familiar ground. There are many points of resemblance between these troops and the Territorials of Great Britain, especially the class regiments, and the battalions recruited from amongst skilled artisans in Birmingham, Manchester or Glasgow. But when I come to the rural militia I find myself exploring a strange country. Some of the corps reminded me of Rhodesian Volunteers. Others again, recruited from amongst the lumbermen and woodsmen of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, seemed to me to be composed of much the same material as must have been the backbone corps of the Confederate Army of the American Civil War. Others again, especially amongst the Western Cavalry, were extraordinary like Boer commandos, well organized, with the boys and old men eliminated, and mounted on hardy serviceable horses instead of ponies. Others yet again, in the more settled districts, were simply stolid country stuff almost entirely in the raw and not by any means ripe for the baptism of fire except in a passive defence. But the difference between categories is so marked that I must take them separately, premising, that I do not judge troops by the standards of a shallow professionalism too often accepted as sole arbiter—standards which elevate spit and polish into the true test of a soldier and deprecate by every possible means the value of the will to fight.

THE WESTERN CAVALRY.

42. The Western Cavalry are fine. The physique of the men is just right. They ride daringly and well. They are as keen as mustard, and their horses, the bronchos of the prairie, show blood and stamina. To make these corps into an extremely formidable force of mounted riflemen it is necessary first, that by some means or other, several days preliminary troop drill should be carried out, and that musketry practice should be pushed beyond its present elementary point. The horses are, at best, half broken and so also the riders. Thus in the excitement of field operations the men get out of hand and fail in the field to look, as they should do, to their troop leaders. Higher education, the power to make any sort of report, to draw a simple sketch, is undeveloped. Still, take the regiments as they stand, they answer their purpose. I mean, they give reasonable assurance that any invader, White Esquimaux or whoever he may be, attempting to penetrate between Port Arthur and the Rockies, will, unless he has with him a numerous and highly trained cavalry, find himself rounded up, harassed and hungry before he has traversed very many miles.

THE EASTERN CAVALRY.

43. Much that has been said in the foregoing paragraph applies also to the Eastern Cavalry; indeed I have seen a squadron in extremest East which, except in its horses, exhibited all the characteristics of the Western Mounted Riflemen, grafted upon a singularly stubborn solid type of trooper. But, take them all in all, the Eastern corps are not composed of natural fine riders, nor have the horses the same quality or

the same more or less level appearance. In some regiments there are 20 per cent. hairy-heeled, hollow-backed animals which would not outlive two or three days of hard fast work. In others again there is too great a proportion of undersized weeds. As to training, non-commissioned officers and men cannot honestly be characterized as being ready for war. Used in war certainly they might be, but not in such a manner as to do themselves full justice. They have quite an idea of how to fight, but they take too long to mount and dismount; they are slow in getting their led horses away and slow in bringing them up. There is far too much talking in the ranks, a fault which more than any other leads to confusion. The ground these regiments may expect to work over is not in any sense cavalry country, so they may concentrate more than other corps on reconnaissance work, communication of intelligence and outposts. At present I can only say that although, were war to break out to-morrow, they would be most useful, they might, with a little more instruction, be twice as useful. I am aware that difficulties considered insuperable stand in the way of any extension of the period of annual training. But if by some means a permanent instructor could give some preliminary drill to troops, the troop leader being present and participating in the work, then, I feel convinced, a great step forward in war efficiency and preparedness would forthwith become manifest.

THE ARTILLERY.

44. The Territorial Artillery of the United Kingdom has proved a sore disappointment to the enemies of a voluntary service militia system. It was claimed that, whereas Yeomanry and Infantry of a certain standard of efficiency could be trained very quickly, provided they were properly organized, Artillery was so technical a corps that it could only be satisfactorily raised upon a more or less permanent basis. Actually, it has turned out that Artillery is perhaps the easiest arm to improvise, provided the right type of man can be attracted and a really competent commander be appointed. In Canada, as in Great Britain, the guns themselves have served as a magnet to draw out the keen and naturally qualified recruits for drivers and gunners. The competent commander also exists, and in some cases does not exist. Certainly most of the Militia Artillery I have seen surprised me by the standards they had attained. The men are able to ride and bring their guns into action with considerable dash. I have seen them move fast, keeping their intervals, for quite a distance along a narrow, bad, winding track through the forest. The horses are quite a suitable class, a little light perhaps, but with quality enough to make up for their lack of weight. Against this must be set the fact that in many batteries the detachments are not properly grounded in elementary gun drill. Many of the men have no clear notion as to how the gun should be laid, the shell fused, or how the brake and firing mechanism should be worked. Still, I repeat, wherever the battery commander knew his business, the guns came into action creditably and, when live shell was fired, the battery got their bracket, not quickly perhaps, but often within reasonable time. Gun drill is easily taught. If the gunners of each battery could only bring to camp with them the knowledge to be acquired in a few hours at gun drill under a good instructor, those batteries of the Canadian Militia commanded by a keen and capable major are, in my opinion, effective units, as they stand, for active service.

THE RURAL INFANTRY.

45. The infantry of the rural corps do not get half the chances enjoyed by their city comrades. Instead of officers and men being able to keep in touch with one another, as well as with their military duties, throughout the year, the whole association of the individuals with one another, the whole of the training, including that of recruits, has to be carried out, from A to Z, during the one brief period of the annual camp. No sort or kind of instruction at other times is officially recognized. It is by camps alone that the rural militiaman is differentiated from a civilian, and the

whole duration of these camps is normally 12 days—actually, deducting a Sunday, and arrival and departure dates, 9 days. A good deal can be accomplished in 9 days by recruits who have mastered the rudiments, or by men serving for their second or third successive camp, but one-third, often a half, of the men in the corps visited by me were recruits who had mastered no rudiment.

ITS TRAINING INSUFFICIENT.

46. The question of sufficiency or otherwise of training is so vital that I will state it in another way. If all the rural corps attended camp for the full period at their full establishment (or something approaching it), and if the bulk, or even one-half, of the officers and men had already attended camp in previous years, the nine days available might enable the battalion to leave camp trained up to about the same standard as that attained by a city corps before it comes to camp. But, as a matter of fact, many of the rural battalions arrive in camp at strength barely equivalent to the war establishment of a company; too often the majority of the men are attending camp for the first time; some of those who do attend fail to remain for the full 12 days, and a portion of the camping period is devoted to field manœuvres and to tactical instruction, for which the rank and file, at any rate, are practically unprepared. For, to practise a brigade attack before the captain has explained to each of his men on the field the how and the wherefore, is just about equivalent to sowing good seed on the unbroken turf of the prairie. The time devoted to musketry practice, too, even with the liberal allowance of miniature rifle ammunition with which it is supplemented, is quite inadequate, measured by any other serious military standards with which I am acquainted. I imply no reflection on the actual work carried out on the ranges. As an old musketry expert, I thought the character of this work and the energy put into it by the instructors were most worthy of commendation. It is the short allowance of time and ammunition which makes any real efficiency so difficult of attainment.

DISCIPLINE OF RURAL CORPS.

47. The lack of cohesion, drill and training is evident enough whether at manœuvre or march past, but the more serious shortcomings do not so much rise to the surface owing to the excellent natural spirit of both officers and men. I refer to field discipline. The French regulations lay down that 'Discipline makes the main force of armies,' and the French have had more experience of armies than most nations. Marshal Saxe, it is true, said that victory must be sought in the heart of human beings, and it is because the rural corps have good hearts that they behave well in peace; show the camp discipline referred to in paragraph 37; and would, I am convinced, do infinitely better than a martinet or drill sergeant would think possible in war. But there is a distinct limit set to the strain which amiable inclinations or even enthusiasm itself will stand during active service. Real discipline cannot be made to order. It must spring from a frequent practice in the art of obedience which grows by degrees into a corps tradition. In modern times this practice in discipline is given by the commander proving to his men every time he acts or every time he gives an order that he knows more about the business in hand than they do. But, in the rural infantry, where many of the officers are not highly instructed, where half the men are recruits, discipline is, and must be, a mere veneer. A hot march along a dusty road gets to the bottom of it pretty quick, although the men, as individuals, may be in good physical condition. On the line of march many corps straggle almost at will; and not only is double the regulation distance taken up, but both sides of the road are blocked, preventing motors and mounted orderlies from passing freely along the column. Yet march discipline is not a mere fad of the military precisian. On the contrary, it is that part of essential military science whereby a commander is enabled to calculate the

length of time he will require to deploy his columns for action; the numbers he can move on one road; and many others of the vital factors which may spell, in their aggregate, victory or defeat.

MERITS OF THE RURAL CORPS.

48. So much for my criticisms. I believe them to be absolutely just. But such criticism does not cover the whole ground. There is another side to the question of the preparedness or unpreparedness of the rural militia for war. I have said their hearts are in the right place; but it is necessary in fairness to add that their physical fitness also, as well as the habitudes of their daily life, would go far in practice to bridge over the want of elementary military training which seems at first sight to separate them, to their disadvantage, from their comrades in city corps. These latter suffer from the prevailing Canadian habit of preferring any other mode of locomotion to making an appeal to their legs, whose chief function seems very often to consist in standing at a street corner waiting for a car. Consequently the bulk of the city men need training in pedestrianism before they are fit for long marches. The rank and file of the rural corps can, from the first day, cover a great lot of ground. Again, the rural men are quite at home in bivouac. They settle down right away and know how to accommodate themselves to heat and cold, wet and dry, wind or calm. They can light fires, cook rations, make bridges, dig trenches, mend carts and, in fact, are born campaigners ready made in many of the essentials of campaigning. Then again these farm hands are not cursed with nerves. Line them out upon a ridge and shrapnel them heavily for half an hour—they would continue to chew gum, hardly realizing that anything very special was happening. Here we have a true military virtue, covering many deficiencies in quickness, knowledge and skill, and this virtue at least I am convinced myself is possessed by the rank and file, and indeed by all ranks of the rural corps.

WHAT IS WANTED.

49. To criticise without suggesting remedies is futile. While the rural corps require, I do not say to make them perfect, but to improve them out of all proportion to the expense involved, is that ha'porth of tar which just makes the difference between sink or swim when the tempest rages. The ha'porth in this case is the money for the sixteen days' training in the year, as in the city corps. This four days extra pay need not, nay, in my opinion, should not, in the Infantry at any rate, be devoted to extending the actual time spent in camp. Rather would I suggest it be spent in giving four days instruction to the men in the neighbourhood of their homes by some such agency as I shall suggest in the chapter headed 'Instruction of the Active Militia.' Three days in squad drill; lectures; catechism; duties on guard; and the fourth day spent in company work under the captain, with, if possible, a certain amount of musketry in each of the four days, would, I say, speaking with a full sense of responsibility, double the immediate war efficiency of rural corps.

THE CORPS OF GUIDES.

50. The possession of a Corps of Guides is, so far as I am aware, a Canadian speciality. The so-called Corps of Guides in India is actually a regular regiment of fighting men. So also the Malay States Guides, and an attempt to raise a Guides Corps on a Territorial basis in the North of England never came to anything. I have, therefore, been much interested in learning what I could concerning the corps itself and the work of its members.

IMPORTANCE OF ITS DUTIES.

51. An organization of this kind must always find it difficult to justify its existence in peace; by war and in war will its justification or the reverse be made

manifest. But certainly, from what I have seen and heard, I should say that in its Corps of Guides Canada possesses an asset of real value. In many respects it resembles the body of trained scouts and reconnoiters formed by Wellington during the Peninsula War, and this is a feature of good promise. Success, if it is to come, will be due to the initiative and the personal efficiency and gumption of each individual guide, and, more than in most corps, it is incumbent on every man to keep himself right up to the mark and ready for the responsible duties which are almost certain to come across him in war.

VARIOUS CORPS AND DEPARTMENTS.

52. To my great regret it so happened that I have enjoyed few opportunities of seeing the Engineers at work in the field; but the samples of their handiwork that I did inspect, notably a very ingenious suspension bridge, at Barriefield, constructed by the Engineer company of Queen's University, Kingston, impressed me favourably.

The Army Service Corps maintain the high reputation of the corps, both by the excellence of their transport arrangements and by the thoroughness of their supply work. I hope it will not be long before the 15 companies still wanted to complete the war organization will be forthcoming.

Hospital accommodation in the camps was excellent. In Canada, as elsewhere, the Medical Corps keeps well ahead of every other branch of the service in the completeness of its preparations for war—a state of affairs due largely to the whole-hearted support it receives from the medical profession in all its grades. A militia is, or rather ought to be, the expression for purposes of war of every form of national activity, and other departments of national life such as the railways, the telegraph companies, motor and motor cyclist unions, &c., might well take a leaf out of the doctors' book and set to work to organize themselves for the defence of their country.

Veterinary arrangements in the various camps I visited were on a sufficient scale. The formation of a Veterinary Corps consisting of non-commissioned officers and men, as well as of officers, is especially interesting, and the experiment will, I trust, prove as successful as it deserves to be.

Of the Army Pay Corps I can only say that I am filled with astonishment at the amount of work its officers and non-commissioned officers manage to get through in the limited period a camp lasts. I venture to express the hope that the simple war system of payment and record work adopted since the South African war in the Regular Army, will be studied with a view to its ultimate adoption in the Canadian forces.

The Ordnance Corps works at high pressure during the camping period. On mobilization the strain on this corps would be enormous, and some scheme should be devised for augmenting it in an emergency by means of officers and men raised on a militia basis and trained to their duties in peace.

VI. INSTRUCTION OF THE ACTIVE MILITIA.

PAUCITY OF INSTRUCTORS.

53. Quality of instruction, quantity of instructors, these are the main desiderata of a liberal education. Therein the curriculum of the Active Militia falls doubly short. Lack of officer instructors necessitates the employment of sergeants in the preparation of officers for promotion examinations, duties for which a non-commissioned officer can rarely be qualified. Finance is, of course, at the root of the evil, but thrift is never less admirable than when it sets itself to starve education. Money laid out on higher instruction brings in a hundred-fold; money economized, a paltry five per cent!

INCREASE ESSENTIAL.

54. The appointment of a General Staff officer to supervise instruction in each Division has marked a big step in advance. The separation, last year, of the instructional staff of the Active Militia from the cadres of the Permanent Force was another stride forwards. All now required to complete work well begun is to make the Division educationally self-contained. Appendix E shows the increase in the instructional staff (20 officers and 10 non-commissioned officers) suggested. I presided over a War Office Committee which considered the instructional staff of the Territorial Force, and I have no hesitation in saying that such an establishment is in truth a bare minimum. There is no doubt that a permanent adjutant and at least three non-commissioned officers (the number allowed in the United Kingdom for a city battalion of the Territorial Force) could be fully justified for most battalions in Canada. In New Zealand every battalion has two permanent non-commissioned officers of its own, as well as its share of a localized instructional staff. Many rural battalions in the United Kingdom have, I may mention, as many as eight sergeant-instructors as well as an adjutant. But I recognize that in present circumstances neither the men nor the money would be forthcoming for an increase on such a scale in Canada.

INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE DECENTRALIZED.

55. My aim is to show how the instruction of the Active Militia might be placed on a scientific basis at the smallest possible cost. To that end I recommend a professional brigade major for each cavalry and infantry brigade, and non-commissioned officers at the rate of one for each city corps and at least one per two rural corps. The brigade major, with a small staff of non-commissioned officers under him, would be responsible for the instruction of all ranks in regimental duties, both tactical and administrative. Let there be no mistake. There would be scope for all their energies. The Militia will absorb all the education they can get, to their greatest benefit. These minor tactical and administrative matters struck Sir John French as being the weakest spots in the Active Militia system; the higher leading incurred no criticism from him, and my own observations have led me to similar conclusions.

PROFESSIONAL BRIGADE MAJORS.

56. The appointment of a professional brigade major to supervise the more elementary work of regimental instruction would leave the General Staff officer of a Division free to devote his attention exclusively to the higher education of the officer. At present he is called on to attend to matters which might well be dealt with by some officer less highly educated and less expensive than himself. True, it may be a wholesome mental discipline to some young officers whose heads are overflowing with doctrines of the Imperial General Staff to find themselves busy conciliating the stationmaster and the constable, and teaching the young Canadian idea the goosetep,—it may be wholesome from their point of view, but it is bad economy from the view point of the Dominion tax-payer. The present position of affairs is equivalent to employing a brilliant university professor to teach three days in a week in an elementary school.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR A BRIGADE MAJOR.

57. Any officer of the Permanent Force who is qualified to act as adjutant of his own unit should be capable of performing the duties of a brigade major permanently employed with a militia brigade.

Militia officers, satisfactorily to perform these duties, should be required to obtain the same qualifications as are demanded from a Militia officer who is appointed to the Permanent Staff of the Militia. They should have the necessary literary qualifications and should undergo the long course (7 months) at the Royal Military College. It might also be desirable to attach them for a time to a unit of the Per-

manent Force, or better still to a regular brigade in the United Kingdom. The remuneration of a brigade major should be sufficient to attract the best officers, whether of the Permanent, Regular or Militia forces. At present an officer drawn from the Permanent Force for instructional duties is no gainer in a pecuniary sense. Similarly, in Great Britain, adjutants of the Territorial infantry corps received no staff pay until a committee presided over by myself got them an extra half-a-crown a day, which just made the difference in the number and quality of the class of candidate coming forward.

ADOPTION OF PROVISIONAL SCHOOL SYSTEM.

58. Under the provisions of such a scheme as I advocate, the provisional school system would be definitely adopted, in principle, and the actual schools of instruction instituted for the purpose of qualifying officers for promotion would no longer be required. Education would in future be brought to the militiaman's doorstep, and he would no longer have to travel perhaps hundreds of miles to seek it. The General Staff officers of Divisions and the brigade majors of brigades would periodically set up schools at places convenient to prospective pupils. The main difference between the proposed and the present provisional school system would lie in the quality of the instructor. The present instructors, mostly non-commissioned officers, may be very good men in a drill hall, but it would be expecting too much of them, as a class, that they should be able to interest and improve educated officers in the higher aspects of their profession. An instructor must stand, intellectually, a head and shoulders above his class. Then, and only then, will he secure eager and appreciative pupils.

INSTRUCTION OF RURAL CORPS.

59. Whilst I am on this subject I should like to traverse, or try to traverse, the prevalent fancy, which is I believe a fallacy, that, for rural corps, training and instruction are impossible save during the camp period. I have the word of the officer commanding one of the most scattered corps in Western Canada that he has managed to work up the training of his recruits and the musketry of his men during the winter and spring months. Evidence to the same effect is afforded by the success of the classes which the signalling staff of the Active Militia is in the habit of holding throughout the year. Of 46 evening classes held this year in every part of Canada up to the 31st May no less than 25 were held for the benefit of rural corps, and during this period 415 certificates of efficiency were issued.

RELATIONS OF ACTIVE MILITIA AND PERMANENT FORCE.

60. The abolition of the existing schools of instruction need not imply a severance of existing associations between the Permanent Force and the Active Militia. The Permanent Force would still continue to provide, as far as its numbers permitted, the instructional staff portion of the establishment of the Active Militia. Further, Militia officers might continue to be attached, for periods more or less prolonged, to units of the Permanent Force. I have dealt with this matter fully at a later stage, where I suggest, as one of two solutions, a concentration of the small detachments of the Permanent Force which are now to be found scattered throughout the length and breadth of Canada.

SUPPLY OF INSTRUCTORS.

61. The source of supply for the instructional staff requires anxious consideration. Demand has already outrun the capacities of the Permanent Force. Doubtless the Royal Canadian Regiment could produce another 20 or 30 individuals for the instructional staff over and above the 80 odd non-commissioned officers now employed at

this duty; but the mere fact of sewing stripes on a private soldier's arm will not put brains into his skull. Better no instructor than a bad one. I have not spent over 40 years of my life in the Regular Army without learning that the miracle of the loaves and small fishes would be beat to a finish if a hundred capable instructors could be produced and maintained out of a peace establishment of 600 soldiers.

DIRECT ENGAGEMENT OF INSTRUCTORS.

62. How, then, is the difficulty to be overcome? There are, I submit, two ways, and two ways only. Either the establishment of the Permanent Force may be largely increased, the field of selection for instructors being thus made wider, or some other source of supply may be tapped. I rule out the first alternative at once as being impracticable. As to the second, there exists a valuable and almost unlimited supply of good instructors in the non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army with its peace establishment of over 240,000 non-commissioned officers and men. Every year numbers of first rate non-commissioned officers in the prime of life are leaving the Colours, and the pecuniary inducements that instructional work in Canada offers are probably sufficient to draw them hither. But the conditions of service must also be made attractive. A self-respecting sergeant of the Regular Army could hardly be expected to enlist in the Canadian Forces as a private on the chance of some day becoming an instructor. If he is wanted for instructional work with sergeant's rank, he should be invited to come over in that capacity, and, if this were done, I have no doubt that many first rate men, who would eventually settle down into the finest type of citizen, would be forthcoming for the job. Such men would be regarded as forming part of the Canadian Permanent Force. They would periodically do refresher courses with its units. They would be liable to serve in war in its ranks. But their primary function would be that of instruction. Let the experiment be made. Public-spirited commanding officers, blessed with the necessary means, have already, in their private capacity, taken the action I recommend and, in every case that came to my notice, with the greatest success.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTIVE MILITIA.

EXISTING CONDITION OF THE MILITIA ORGANIZATION.

63. Owing to the rapid progress which has been made in giving effect to the divisional organization since Sir John French's visit in 1910, not much need be said under this heading. There are still gaps to be filled in, but every one I have consulted seems confident that before very long these will cease to exist. I can myself testify to the readiness with which the idea of raising new units catches on, although satisfaction with such enthusiasm is apt to be tempered by the discovery that too often the class of unit demanded by military exigencies is not the kind that commends itself to the fancy of the localities concerned. Here we come upon the very touchstone of the voluntary system. Unless cities, townships and districts are prepared to make some sacrifice for the common good, and will put the requirements of the military authorities above their own idiosyncracies, the idea of raising, on a voluntary basis, an army that can be relied on for the defence of the country will, in the long run, have to be abandoned. Until the accepted war organization is complete, not only in units but also in men and material, the raising of new units superfluous to that organization should, on financial grounds, be discouraged.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY.

64. Undoubtedly there is scope in Canada for a general survey of the military situation somewhat similar to that which took place in the United Kingdom in 1907.

Up to that date forces had been allowed to spring fortuitously into existence irrespective of any settled plan or policy. Where artillery was wanted infantry battalions appeared, and so on with all arms and services. What, therefore, Lord Haldane had to undertake as a first measure of reform was a reconstitution of the **Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteer** forces, with a view to satisfying the requirements of a well thought out scheme of war organization. The surgical operation that followed was intensely painful and demanded good nerve in the operator and his assistants: but shrieks were disregarded, and now order reigns where chaos spread itself before. In Canada there has lately been a distinct wholesome tendency towards filling up shortages in one branch from redundancies in another, but the establishment still offers scope to the reformer's energy. Engineers of the Active Militia are urgently required at Halifax, Quebec and Esquimalt. They should be raised at the expense, **if necessary**, of other less indispensable local corps. Again, there are instances of two or even more corps of various kinds being drawn from towns and districts capable, in present circumstances, of supporting one vigorous unit at most. Amalgamation at all costs is here the true remedy.

COMPLETION OF EXISTING ORGANIZATION NECESSARY.

65. Far be it from me to urge that, in a country with a rapidly growing population like Canada, future possibilities in army-building should be ignored any more than they are in town-planning, or in estimating real estate values. All I mean to suggest is that equilibrium and proportion should not be too much sacrificed to future and perhaps far distant developments. Better complete the structure now building than put too many new extensions in hand. To leave the existing Divisions without batteries and Army Service Corps companies whilst raising battalions not urgently required, might be likened to the action of a citizen who delayed putting a roof on his residence and set to work instead laying the foundations of a ball room.

PEACE AND WAR ESTABLISHMENTS.

66. Closely connected with the question of amalgamating existing corps and of raising new units, is the problem of the peace establishment and the peace strength of the Active Militia. The war establishment of this force is about two and a half times its peace establishment and three and a half times its peace strength. This disproportion is too great. In every militia force with which I am acquainted, the Swiss and New Zealand Militias and the Territorial Force in Great Britain included, the aim of the military authorities is always to make peace establishments and peace strength coincide. Unquestionably the peace establishment of existing units in the Active Militia should be raised. Were this done as part of such a general review of the military situation as I have suggested, the advisability of reducing certain weak units and amalgamating them with stronger ones would force itself to the foreground and, simultaneously, the raising of new units in growing towns and in newly populated districts would be facilitated. A minimum strength should be fixed for all units, and corps falling below it should be warned that they will be liable to be amalgamated with some other corps. Such a policy would, I am fully aware, make considerable demands on the patriotism of Canadians. No one likes to see old established corps lopped off but, in Canada, the pruning knife would have to be used only sparingly. Branches whose sap runs feebly are fortunately few in number.

HORSE REGISTRATION.

67. The question of horse and transport registration calls for some remark. I feel bound to state that some delay, especially in the mobilization of city corps, would be caused by the omission to make these registrations in peace; but, at the same time, I must also admit that there is such a superabundance of horses in Canada

that the matter is neither so serious nor so pressing as it would be in Europe. In any case I am doubtful whether, in the existing state of the Canadian law, a thorough-going classification of animals and of vehicles would be possible. In England, recently, additional legislation on the subject was found to be necessary and, under the law as it now stands, action is being taken with a view to ensuring that on mobilization the animals of all kinds required by units shall reach them within a specified number of days. The machinery required, not only for registering animals in peace but also for collecting them on war supervening, is not so simple as might be thought. Should the Canadian military authorities desire to go more fully into this subject, I have not the least doubt that the Army Council in London would gladly place all the data at their disposal.

DEFICIENCIES IN AMMUNITION AND STORES.

68. As regards deficiencies in guns, ammunition and stores of all kinds, Appendix D speaks for itself. Not to put too fine a point upon it there are no equipment, clothing* or reserve stores for issue on the outbreak of war. Prior to the South African campaign, the enormous drain on reserves of material that war entails was not fully appreciated in the United Kingdom. After that campaign the accumulation of a mass of war material in peace was accepted without one word of protest from any party. Before the war ended, a committee presided over by Sir Francis Mowatt, formerly Permanent Head of the Treasury, was assembled to inquire into the whole matter and make recommendations, as well as to consider the proper distribution of reserve stores and their turnover on a scientific plan. As a result of this committee's deliberations, Parliament laid out many millions of pounds in creating an adequate reserve of military armaments and stores. These reserves, known as the 'Mowatt Reserves,' now represent an irreducible minimum fixed by Parliament below which stocks in the country are not allowed to fall.

INVESTIGATION REQUIRED.

69. The assembly of a committee or commission on the lines of the Mowatt Committee would enable the Canadian people to realize the exceedingly awkward, not to say dangerous position in which they stand. The expenditure of millions of dollars is at issue. Not only reserves of stores but also the questions of storehouses, of ordnance personnel and of the turnover of stores—the latter a great difficulty where a militia is concerned—ought to be faced fairly and squarely. If any man will openly stand up and say that Canada should keep no reserve stores for war, then let him do so, and the people at least will know exactly where they are. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more unfair to men who so patriotically place their time, in peace, at the disposal of the country, than to leave them, in war, at the mercy of an enemy owing to lack of ammunition and absolutely necessary war material.

EXPENDITURE INVOLVED.

70. I recognize that many of the proposals I have felt myself constrained to put forward in connection with the organization of the Canadian military forces will involve additional expenditure, even heavy expenditure. The price paid by Canada for insurance is, however, inconsiderable, and even if it were doubled it would still remain inconsiderable in comparison with the sacrifices that other nations are called on to make. In the United Kingdom, for instance, naval and military expenditure per head of the population is now more than five times the contribution that each individual Canadian is called on to pay for estimated expenditure both naval and

* The position as regards clothing on mobilization would be improved, and the turnover of clothing reserves would be facilitated, if service dress was made obligatory for the whole of the Active Militia.

military. In Appendix F I give a statement showing the population and the naval and military expenditure during the past ten years of each of the great self-governing nations in the British Empire. For the last year (1911-12) for which statistics were available, naval and military expenditure per head of the European population was as follows:—

United Kingdom.	\$7 41
Canada	1 47*
Australia	5 11
New Zealand	2 43
South Africa	1 49

VIII.—THE PERMANENT FORCE.

ITS PURPOSE.

71. The *raison d'être* of the Permanent Force is:—

- (a) In war the defence of Canada, whose fortresses may have to be manned at a few hours notice.
- (b) In peace, the preservation of the armament, search lights, works and material of the fortresses.
- (c) The upkeep of units whence an instructional staff for the Active Militia can be drawn and wherein this personnel can be periodically kept up to date by means of refresher courses.
- (d) The maintenance of these same units at a high level of efficiency so that they may serve as standards for the Active Militia.

THE RÔLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER.

72. These are the accepted purposes for which the Permanent Force exists, and I anticipate yet another will arise. The day is surely not far distant when Canada, equal in population to the Mother Country and vying in wealth with any State in the world, will be impelled by the force of the sentiment *noblesse oblige* to take her share in educating and elevating the subject races of the Empire. When that day arrives, she will look out east and west on to the two oceans which now form her frontiers and will find there posts like Bermuda, Jamaica, and Hong Kong on the imperial lines of communication, and, it may be, other imperial possessions further afield, whose protection in the natural order of events would fall within her sphere of influence. Canada will then have to learn the same lesson that Rome, in her day, learned in the hard school of experience, namely, that for overseas imperial work a permanent professional force is absolutely essential. No form of militia service will enable a country to satisfy its creative instincts or to impress its own ideals of justice and freedom upon more backward communities. The number and quality of Canada's professional voluntarily enlisted troops must determine the extent to which she will be able to influence for good the progress of great masses of a less highly developed humanity.

LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITIAMAN.

73. I wish here to disclaim once and for all any intention to press for an increase in the number of permanent units now maintained in Canada. I am in entire agreement with my predecessor, Field Marshal Sir John French, in thinking that in present circumstances Canada best fulfils her duty to the Empire as a whole by guaranteeing her own defence against external attack, and I trust that in my remarks on the Active Militia I have been able to make it clear that I regard that force, backed as it should

* Actual military expenditure is at the rate of just over one dollar per head. Estimated naval expenditure for 1911-12 was 3,281,500 dollars, or 45 cents per head.

be by the Reserve Militia, as the true source of the defensive power of Canada. None the less, at some future day Canada may urgently need her Permanent Forces for a purpose which her Militia cannot possibly fulfill. Therefore she will be well advised, I think, to take close interest in the nucleus she at present possesses.

A POLICY OF DISPERSION.

74. Canada now stands at a parting of the ways. She must soon decide whether she wants to retain her permanent units as effective instruments for war and as models for the Active Militia, or whether she prefers to treat their internal efficiency as altogether secondary to the interests of the Active Militia. I hold no brief for either case; I merely try here to define the broad issues. The first alternative demands concentration; the adoption of the second would render it inevitable that, to form small instructional schools here, there and everywhere,* existing units should be broken up and scattered wider and ever wider with the growth of the Active Militia. Dispersion, as every soldier knows, destroys efficiency. A battalion permanently split up simply ceases to be a battalion. All the world over the small detachment is a synonym for waste and slackness. The employed man and the fatigue man are its principal products. Discipline suffers; keenness is killed; unworthy military standards are set up whereby civilians are prejudiced and misled. The environment of officers and non-commissioned officers renders the pursuit of the loftier ideals and attainments of the soldier too difficult. So, in the end, small detachments tend to become unsatisfactory even in the instructional sphere for which they were created. A militiaman attached for training to some miserably weak company in an outlying station must, and does, obtain a wholly wrong impression of what life ought to be in a well supervised and hard-worked infantry battalion.

A POLICY OF CONCENTRATION.

75. The alternative to dispersing the Canadian Permanent Forces in small detachments would be to concentrate them in a few stations—the fewer, the better. The Royal Canadian Regiment for example might, in course of time, be brought together, if not wholly, at least by half battalions, and, similarly, the squadrons of the Royal Canadian Dragoons might, when buildings permit, be assembled at one headquarters. A marked increase in efficiency would certainly follow, and the value of these units as a training ground for the instructional staff of the Active Militia would be proportionately enhanced. Also, as I have already suggested, attached Militia officers would thus get some insight into progressive training and well ordered interior economy. Lest it should be objected that the small schools for the Militia which have hitherto existed side by side with scattered portions of the cavalry and infantry regiments must then disappear, let me reiterate my belief that the time is fully ripe for such a change.** I have already advocated bringing instruction and education closer to the militiaman, and have made definite proposals for increasing the instructional staff of the Active Militia to that end. The direct bearing of those proposals on this question of Permanent Force concentration will, I trust, be fully appreciated.

CHOICE OF POLICIES.

76. It is for the Defence Office to decide which of these policies shall be pursued. Should it determine to scatter the small Permanent Force more and more widely, its disappearance as a group of combatant units is a mere question of time. Better per-

* The existing distribution of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lord Strathcona's Horse and of the Royal Canadian Regiment, as well as of the Cavalry and Infantry Instructional Cadres, is shown in Appendix G.

** *Vide* chapter VI. on the Instruction of the Active Militia.

haps in such case at once to give the Permanent Force its *coup de grâce* and apply the money so saved to other purposes.

If, on the other hand, it is determined to maintain and improve the Permanent Force, the course to be pursued lies clear. The assumption should be acted upon that, apart from the emergencies of the moment, such as the training of instructors for the Active Militia, the purpose underlying the existence of the Permanent Force is an imperial purpose. Assimilation of the permanent units to the accepted imperial pattern is therefore all important. In training and in interior economy; in discipline; in the educational qualifications of officers and men, Canadian Permanent Force units are already closely akin to corresponding units in the Regular Army. It requires only some slight modifications in their establishments and strength to complete the process.

EXCHANGE OF UNITS SUGGESTED.

77. "Why not send us a battalion of Highlanders so that we Militiamen may see the Regular Army at work in our own manœuvre camps?"

Such was the ingenuous question put to me the other day by one of the keenest of Canadians. I replied that economy in high places had now so closely pored the cheese that every British battalion, other than His Majesty's Foot Guards, was already earmarked in peace for a definite purpose. Abroad, it forms part of an essential oversea garrison; at home, it feeds a foreign service sister battalion.

EFFECT OF SUCH EXCHANGE.

78. But, thinking over the matter, it has since occurred to me that, if Canada owned a regiment or a battalion moulded upon the Regular pattern, she could replace any similar unit loaned her by the Old Country. Such an interchange would, I make bold to say, mark an epoch in the evolution of imperial organization worth a wilderness of speeches and flags. Memories of a time when Canada was the most popular station to which a British regiment could be sent would be most happily revived. The presence of a Canadian regiment in London, Delhi or Cairo would stir the imagination not only of the Five Nations themselves but of the whole outside world.

IX. LIABILITY OF THE MILITARY FORCES.

PRESENT STATE OF CANADIAN LAW.

79. An imperial officer must approach with the utmost diffidence a subject so purely domestic as the legislation which determines where in the world a Canadian soldier may, or may not, serve. Even among those most interested, namely, the soldiers themselves, few seem to realize that, not only can no Canadian militiaman in his capacity as such, volunteer for oversea service, but that it is extremely doubtful whether there exists in Canada any constitutional means of organizing any armed force whatsoever for extra-territorial service. The Government of Canada, it would appear, has no more power to commission a person to undertake command of its troops, say, in the Antipodes, or to discharge there the judicial and other functions which usually belong to an officer, than it has to commission him to act as a justice of the peace in such a region with respect to persons who had gone from Canada. At all events, the question is, to say the least of it, in such a state as to require legislation to put it beyond a doubt.

HISTORY OF THE CITIZEN FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN.

80. The constitutional history of the Militia and Volunteer forces in Great Britain during the past century has a direct bearing upon this very matter. Prior to the Napoleonic wars no militiamen, either individually or collectively, were permitted

to volunteer for service outside the United Kingdom, and it was not till 1813 that an Act was passed "to enable His Majesty to accept the services of a proportion of the Militia out of the United Kingdom for the vigorous prosecution of the war." Henceforward the Militia of the country enjoyed the privilege of volunteering for service overseas in time of war, a privilege of which it patriotically availed itself during the Crimean and South African wars. The Volunteer force raised in 1860 remained till 1907 in the position that the Militia was in till 1813. Before a Volunteer could go to South Africa in 1900, he had to sacrifice his rank and status as a Volunteer and accept engagement to all intents and purposes as a Regular soldier.

LEGAL CHANGES OF 1907.

81. In 1907, it was decided, largely on the representation of Volunteer officers, to place the Territorial Force, into which the Volunteers were to be merged, on the same legal footing as the Militia in respect of oversea service. Section 13 of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, passed in that year, reads as follows:—

"13. (1) Any part of the Territorial Force shall be liable to serve in any part of the United Kingdom, but no part of the Territorial Force shall be carried or ordered to go out of the United Kingdom

(2) Provided that it shall be lawful for His Majesty if he thinks fit, to accept the offer of any part or men of the Territorial Force, signified through their commanding officer, to subject themselves to the liability—

(a) To serve in any place outside the United Kingdom; or

(b) To be called out for actual military service for purposes of defence at such places in the United Kingdom as may be specified in their agreement, whether the Territorial Force is embodied or not;

and, upon any such offer being accepted, they shall be liable, whenever required during the period to which the offer extends, to serve or be called out accordingly.

(3) A person shall not be compelled to make such an offer, or be subjected to such liability as aforesaid except by his own consent, and a commanding officer shall not certify any voluntary offer previously to his having explained to every person making the offer that the offer is to be purely voluntary on his part."

As the law now stands, there is not one of the seven hundred thousand odd officers and men raised voluntarily in the United Kingdom to serve the King in a military capacity who cannot, if he so wills, take part in a war overseas without sacrificing the status or the capacity in which he has been serving in peace.

EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE LAW.

82. Were Canada to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and legislate on the subject of her citizen forces volunteering for service overseas, she would, I believe, be the first of the great Dominions to follow the Mother Country's example in this matter. In so doing, she would make it clear that she had learnt one of the great lessons of the South African war, which was that, in this matter of imperial assistance, organization and preparation should replace improvisation. I am given to understand that a paper scheme exists at the present time for mobilizing a force in Canada for imperial purposes. So long, however, as the law of the land remains what it is, such a scheme, I need hardly point out, is unlikely to carry conviction to the minds of either friend or foe. Till the statesman moves, the soldier is paralyzed.

X. ADEQUACY OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES FOR HOME DEFENCE.

FACTORS OF THE PROBLEM.

83. The first factor here is the fighting force to be encountered; the next, the time in which that force can get to work. But as, by a diplomatic convention, nations not actually shedding one another's blood are supposed to be good friends, Canada's enemies must perforce remain masked under the symbol x . Consequently the time and trouble it will take to mobilize and get on the march remains scarcely more definite than y . Herein lies the difficulty of stating an equation so as to show convincingly how far the Canadian military forces stand above, or fall below, the value $x + y$. All I can do in writing an open report is to ask that I may be trusted to take a comprehensive view of the world situation, and that I may be believed when I promise to try not to exaggerate future dangers.

READINESS ESSENTIAL.

84. The enemy may be undisciplined—led by incompetent generals. The outbreak of war may be followed by a long period of suspended activity during which Canada can complete her units up to establishment; collect her reserves of ammunition and stores; and requisition horses and carts. This would be extremely convenient—but will it so happen? In any case, I shall write under no such assumption. For I know well that methodical preparation, followed by action in due course, is not a characteristic of the nations flying the Union Jack, whereas it is precisely the strong point of some of their potential foes.

A State entering directly into war from its normal condition of peace is at a terrible disadvantage when pitted against the State which gets ready before it allows its politicians, diplomats or press to raise angry voices. Unfortunately—or fortunately some may think—every imperial officer has to set out upon his investigations assured that, under no circumstances, will his rulers again make a bid for the priceless initiative. They have become too civilized. The men of Copenhagen are no more.

TIME ALL IMPORTANT.

85. I shall assume throughout then that no special measures will have been taken in Canada up to the day when war is upon us. I shall assume even that all the enemy's shipping in Canadian harbours is then allowed to escape. And if I am asked why I assume such things, I can only say I have studied the country and believe it will be so. When a nation does not, at the bottom of its heart, really believe in war, it is bound to be taken by surprise and badly handicapped when war does break out. For the ways of war are changing just as fast as, or faster than, the ways of peace. The railway and the wireless are busy eating into space and time. Distance, as we talk, is ceasing to serve as any protection. Operations which formerly took months are now carried out in weeks, and will be carried out in days—perhaps hours! Still, there are many favourable points to set against the birthright of an incurable optimism, and so now, having made manifest my frame of mind and the broad issue, I propose to proceed with the analysis.

THE TASK OF THE MILITARY FORCES.

86. The task of home defence that falls on the active military forces, as I conceive it, would be:—

- (a) to protect the vitals of Canada (the chief towns, the arsenals and military stores, the ports on the coasts and the main railway systems) against raids, great or small.

(b) to delay the enemy's main attack until the Reserve Militia can be assembled and knocked into some sort of military shape.

In point of time the first of these tasks is clearly the most pressing. I have explained that I cherish few illusions as to the Militia being ready, mobilized for action before the declaration of war—supposing any such declaration to be made. Failing this, every detail of mobilization as affecting men, horses, stores, transport, &c., must be thought out beforehand so as to enable the units to be standing ready at their war stations within as few hours as possible after the outbreak of hostilities. In point of training the internal efficiency of every unit should be such that the services of the professional instructor could be at once dispensed with. All plans for the movement of troops by rail should have been carefully matured in peace. Such, briefly, are the conditions to be fulfilled before the active military forces can be relied upon to cope with their duties under (a), and nothing in my whole report is more important than the answer my conscience should enable me to give to the question, have these conditions actually been fulfilled?

FITNESS OF ACTIVE MILITIA TO MEET RAIDS.

87. In 1910, Field Marshal Sir John French officially reported as follows:—

“At present it would not be possible to put the Militia in the field in a fit condition to undertake active operations until after the lapse of a considerable period.”

Since 1910, great progress has been made in many directions. Organization is very markedly more thorough; training has been levelled up in some respects and, under the supervision of the General Staff, the education of all ranks, and especially of the higher ranks, has been improved. Let Sir John French's “considerable period” be represented by ‘a’; the Militia should now be able to undertake active operations in $\frac{a}{2}$ time. I honestly think that as great an advance has been made during the past three years as it would be reasonable to expect, seeing that the stimulus of danger has been entirely wanting. But there is no scope for any resting on the oars. Let there be none; and if the recommendations I have made are in the main carried out, another four or five years should put Canada quite at her ease as to raids, great or small.

PREPARATION AGAINST ORGANIZED ATTACK.

88. Whether the Canadian military forces could make good the secondary duty (b) of holding off an enemy's main attack until the Reserve Militia takes shape depends on two considerations:—

Within what period after a declaration of war could the enemy bring a serious attack to bear?

Within what space of time would the Reserve Militia be mobilized?

The object of this report is to enable Canadians to solve these problems for themselves. State policy is so much involved in their consideration that all I can do is to define the issues and sum up the factors. But even to mention them is to emphasize the fact that the Active Militia in itself provides a framework altogether insufficient for Canada's needs if her existence is seriously threatened from without; and that she must, to meet such a contingency, put her trust in the development and organization of her Reserve Militia. Let Canadians bear in mind that the two considerations I have just categorically stated are intimately related. Let them keep a close eye upon the preparations of potential foes, and see to it that the state of readiness of their Reserve Militia shall always outstrip by a day at least the time wherein any foreign Power could place a powerful army on Canadian soil.

IAN HAMILTON, *General,*
Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces.

APPENDIX A.

SUMMARY OF CHIEF RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Increase in the Instructional Staff of the Active Militia.
2. Localization of instruction in divisional areas by means of provisional schools.
3. Dependent on (2), abolition of central schools for cavalry and infantry.
4. Increase in the remuneration of officer instructors.
5. Direct engagement from outside sources of some of the sergeant instructors.
6. Increase in the peace establishment of the Active Militia.
7. Institution of a minimum strength for units of the Active Militia.
8. Amalgamation of weak units.
9. Sixteen days' paid training for rural corps as well as for city corps.
10. Training of rural corps at other times than during camping period.
11. Consideration of alternative policies affecting the Permanent Force:—
 - (a) Wider dispersion of Permanent Force units as the Active Militia increases; or
 - (b) Concentration of Permanent Force units and their employment as units.
12. Assimilation of Permanent Force units, if concentrated, to the Regular model.
13. Interchange of Permanent Force and Regular units.
14. Creation of adequate war reserves of arms, ammunition, clothing, equipment and stores.
15. Scientific treatment of horse-registration in peace.
16. Institution of a National Reserve.
17. Preparation of classified muster-rolls of men liable and fit for service.
18. Organization on paper of the Reserve Militia.

APPENDIX B.

TABLE showing the units required to complete Divisions, Mounted Brigades and other Field Formations, but excluding administrative units for Lines of Communication.

Units, &c., required to complete.	Eastern Section.		Western Section.		Total.
	Divi- sions.	Mounted Brigades.	Mounted Brigades.	Other Field For- mations.	
<i>Artillery.</i>					
Divisional Artillery Headquarters.....	6				6
Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters.....	6			2	8
Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade Headquarters.....	5				5
Batteries—					
13-pr.....		1			1
18-pr.....	24			6	30
Howitzer.....	16				16
Heavy.....				1	1
Ammunition Columns—					
Mounted Brigade.....		4	3		7
Field Artillery Brigade.....	9			2	11
Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade.....	5				5
Heavy Artillery.....	2			1	3
Divisional.....	6				6
Special.....				2	2
<i>Engineers.</i>					
Divisional Engineer Headquarters.....	2				2
Field Troops.....		3			3
Field Companies.....	4			1	5
<i>Corps of Guides.</i>					
Mounted Companies.....	5				5
<i>Signal Service.</i>					
Wireless detachments.....		3	3		6
Telegraph detachments.....	4			1	5
<i>Infantry.</i>					
Battalions.....	2				2
<i>A.S.C.</i>					
Companies.....	14			1	15
<i>A.M.C.</i>					
Field Ambulances.....	4			2	6
Cavalry Field Ambulances.....		1			1

APPENDIX C.

ESTIMATE of the Personnel required on Mobilization, excluding Administrative Services on Lines of Communication.

Detail.	Mobile Field Formations.		L. of C. Defence Troops.		Garrisons.		Unallotted Units.		Depôt Cadres.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
Commanders, Staff Officers, etc...	215	14,672	4	1,905	10	485	29	630	350	10,000	229	27,692
Cavalry.....	690	17,074	3	54	23	2,018			350	10,000	1,184	29,146
Artillery.....	602	17,074	3	54	122	2,018			350	10,000	1,077	29,146
Engineers.....	99	3,145			15	292			50	1,500	1,164	4,937
Corps of Guides.....	24	288	4	39	4	39					28	327
Infantry.....	2,460	80,608	456	14,933	212	6,820			1,500	50,000	4,628	152,361
Signal Service.....	44	1,268									44	1,268
Army Service Corps.....	198	3,406			6	197			100	1,500	304	5,103
Army Medical Corps.....	416	5,579	19		43	308	1		250	3,000	729	8,887
Army Veterinary Corps.....	101	6	5		3		1				110	6
Ordnance Corps.....	6				4	68					10	74
Motor Corps.....	45	45									45	45
Army Pay Corps.....					3	12					3	12
Postal Corps.....		110		2							112	12
Military Staff Clerks.....		36				10						46
	4,900	126,243	579	16,894	445	10,249	31	630	2,600	76,000	8,555	230,016
	131,143		17,473		10,694		661		78,600		238,571	

APPENDIX D.

STATEMENT showing the principal articles required on mobilization, including dépôt requirements.

Articles.	Total requirements.	Now in hands of troops.	On Ordnance charge.	Total on hand.	Required to complete.	Remarks.	
Guns, { 13-pr. Q.F.....	36	24	24	12		
Guns, { 18-pr. ".....	284	100	100	184	36 under order.	
heavy artillery....	36	24	24	12		
Howitzers.....	84	8	8	76	24 under order.	
Rifles.....	200,000	58,290	44,072	102,362	97,638	13,500 under order.	
Machine-guns.....	300	13	13	287	50 under order.	
Ammunition, { 13-pr. Q.F.....	28,000	21,000	21,000	7,000	3,000 under order.	
	gun, { 18-pr. ".....	244,000	71,000	71,000	173,000	36,000 under order.
	heavy artillery	14,000	12,200	12,200	1,800	
	howitzer, Q.F.....	72,000	8,800	8,800	63,200	24,300 under order.
small arm ".....	200,000,000	1,446,052	53,754,655	55,200,707	144,799,293		
Jackets, drab.....	200,000	2,000	5,800	7,800	192,200		
Trousers, drab.....	150,000	2,000	10,000	12,000	138,000		
Caps, drab.....	200,000	2,000	5,200	7,200	192,800		
Greatcoats, drab.....	150,000	30,000	16,400	46,400	103,600		
Cloaks.....	60,000	16,000	6,700	22,700	37,300		
Breeches.....	60,000	16,000	16,500	32,500	27,500		
Leggings, prs.....	150,000	46,000	18,000	64,000	86,000		
Web, or valise, equipment, sets.....	150,000	30,000	6,000	36,000	114,000		
Water bottles.....	200,000	46,000	15,000	61,000	139,000		
Mess tins.....	200,000	46,000	9,000	55,000	145,000		
Bandoliers.....	50,000	8,500	3,700	12,200	37,800		
Implements, entrenching.....	150,000	150,000		
Saddlery, sets.....	30,000	10,500	5,000	11,000	19,000		
Wallets, prs.....	20,000	9,000	8,800	17,800	2,200		
Buckets, rifle.....	20,000	8,000	2,300	10,300	9,700		
Kettles, camp.....	12,000	700	700	11,300		
Picketing gear, sets.....	70,000	25,000	25,000	45,000		
Sheets, ground.....	150,000	47,000	47,000	103,000		
Farriers' tools, sets.....	1,800	100	100	1,700		
Saddlers' tools, sets.....	700	20	20	680		
Forges, field.....	350	70	70	280		
Blankets.....	150,000	91,000	91,000	59,000		
Wire cutters.....	5,000	20	20	4,980		

APPENDIX E.

INSTRUCTIONAL Staff of Active Militia.

Appointment.	Number Establishment.		Number Proposed.		Remarks.
	Officers.	N. C. Os.	Officers.	N. C. Os.	
G. S. O. 2nd Grade.....	6	7	(a) Halifax, Toronto and Western Canada.
G. S. O. 3rd Grade.....	1	3 (a)	(b) Some of the smaller brigades such as the 10th and 19th Infantry Bri-
Brigade Majors { Cavalry.....	7	gades might be grouped, reducing this to about 20.
{ Infantry.....	22 (b)	
Officer Instructors { Cavalry.....	4	
{ Infantry.....	8	(c) Calculated at the rate of 1 instructor per city corps and one per two
N. C. O. Instructors { Cavalry.....	33	33	rural corps. Two assistants for each General Staff Officer are also
{ Infantry.....	82	92 (c)	included.

APPENDIX F.

STATEMENT showing Population and Naval and Military Expenditure of the Self-Governing States in the British Empire.

N.B.—The statement, in so far as it relates to the Oversea Dominions, has been compiled from information contained in the Annual Returns of Military and Naval Resources.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Financial Year.	Population.	Military Expenditure	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Military and Naval Expenditure per head of Population.
		£	£ s. d.	£	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1902-3.....	42,315,704	68,863,527	1 2 6½	31,003,977	14 7½	2 7 2½
1903-4.....	42,654,581	36,728,580	17 2½	35,709,477	16 8½	1 13 11½
1904-5.....	42,993,458	28,895,624	13 5½	36,859,681	17 1½	1 10 7
1905-6.....	43,332,335	28,478,863	13 1½	33,151,841	15 3½	1 8 5
1906-7.....	43,671,212	28,501,421	13 0½	31,472,087	14 4½	1 7 5½
1907-8.....	44,010,089	27,141,642	12 4	31,251,156	14 2½	1 6 6½
1908-9.....	44,348,966	26,859,299	12 1½	32,181,309	14 6	1 6 7½
1909-10.....	44,687,843	27,243,825	12 2½	35,734,015	15 11½	1 8 2
1910-11.....	45,026,721	27,549,491	12 2½	40,419,336	17 7	1 9 9½
1911-12.....	45,365,599	*27,690,000	12 2½	42,414,257	18 8½	1 10 10½

*The total of army estimates 1911-12.

CANADA.

		†			£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1902-3.....	5,553,417	424,962	1 6½	24,000	1	1 7½
1903-4.....	5,735,519	641,768	2 3	26,000	1	2 4
1904-5.....	5,917,621	771,100	2 7	26,000	1	2 8
1905-6.....	6,099,723	1,105,983	3 7½	44,000	1½	3 9
1906-7.....	6,281,825	858,032	2 8½	44,000	1½	2 10½
1907-8.....	6,463,927	1,396,476	4 4	90,000	3½	4 7½
1908-9.....	6,646,029	1,334,322	4 0½	99,000	3½	4 4
1909-10.....	6,828,132	1,230,115	3 7½	107,100	3½	3 11
1910-11.....	7,010,235	1,448,318	4 1½	656,300	1 10½	6 0
1911-12.....	7,192,338	*1,546,220	4 3½	*656,300	1 10	6 1½

*Estimated expenditure.

†The amounts shown in this column have been taken from the annual returns of military and naval resources.

STATEMENT showing Population and Naval and Military Expenditure of the Self-Governing States in the British Empire—*Continued.*

AUSTRALIA.

Financial Year.	Population.	Military Expenditure	Military Expenditure per head of Population.	Naval Expenditure	Naval Expenditure per head of Population.	Military and Naval Expenditure per head of Population.
		£	£ s. d.	£	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1902-3.....	3,841,921	615,946	3 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	149,621	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 11 $\frac{1}{2}$
1903-4.....	3,910,041	615,758	3 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	239,899	1 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1904-5.....	3,978,161	728,633	3 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	205,966	1 0 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 8
1905-6.....	4,046,281	718,252	3 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	252,091	1 3	4 9 $\frac{1}{2}$
1906-7.....	4,114,401	780,021	3 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	255,774	1 2 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 0 $\frac{1}{2}$
1907-8.....	4,182,521	823,585	3 11 $\frac{1}{4}$	511,159	2 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1908-9.....	4,250,642	781,989	3 8	268,602	1 3	4 11
1909-10.....	4,318,763	1,204,446	5 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	330,435	1 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1910-11.....	4,374,138	1,539,400	7 0 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,466,617	6 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 9
1911-12.....	4,455,005	*2,699,678	11 11	*2,075,458	9 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 1 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

*Estimated expenditure.

NEW ZEALAND.

1902-3.....	795,890	254,110	6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	21,452	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 11
1903-4.....	819,062	209,049	5 1 $\frac{1}{4}$	21,523	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
1904-5.....	842,234	234,842	5 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	40,742	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
1905-6.....	865,406	195,028	4 6	42,280	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
1906-7.....	888,578	167,639	3 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	40,000	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 8
1907-8.....	912,556	195,000	4 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	40,000	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1908-9.....	936,534	206,451	4 4 $\frac{3}{4}$	40,000	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 3
1909-10.....	960,512	195,323	4 0 $\frac{1}{4}$	*100,000	2 0 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1910-11.....	984,490	219,009	4 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	*100,000	1 11	6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1911-12.....	1,008,468	412,307	8 2	*100,000	1 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 1 $\frac{1}{2}$

*These figures do not include the cost of the battle cruiser presented by New Zealand under the New Zealand Naval Defence Act, 1909.

SOUTH AFRICA.

1910-11.....	Europeans. 1,278,025	230,617	3 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	86,555	1 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 11 $\frac{1}{2}$
1911-12.....	Europeans. 1,301,056	*320,604	4 11	85,000	1 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 2 $\frac{1}{2}$

*Estimated expenditure.

APPENDIX G.

RETURN of Distribution of Cavalry of Permanent Force, R.C.D., and L.S.H. (R.C.)
by Stations.

Stations.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	N.C.Os. and men.	Total.
Toronto.....	6	2	72	80
St. Jean, P.Q.....	4	1	66	71
Winnipeg.....	8	2	94	104
	18	5	232	255

INSTRUCTIONAL CADRE.

Winnipeg.....	1	1	4	6
Halifax.....			1	1
St. Jean, P.Q.....	1	1	6	8
Calgary.....			2	2
London.....			1	1
Toronto.....	1	1	7	9
Kingston.....			2	2
	3	3	23	29
R. M. College R.C.D. Riding Establishment.....	1		12	13

RETURN of Distribution of Infantry of Permanent Force (Royal Canadian Regiment.)

Stations.	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	N.C.Os. and men.	Total.
London.....	3	39	42
Toronto.....	4	1(a)	73	78
Fredericton.....	2	51	53
Halifax.....	14	392	406
Quebec.....	3	45	48
	26	1(a)	600	627

INSTRUCTIONAL CADRE.

Winnipeg.....	2	8	10
Fredericton.....	1	8	9
Halifax.....	1	22	23
Montreal.....	1	8	9
Quebec.....	1	1	8	10
Calgary.....	2	2
London.....	1	1	10	12
Toronto.....	1	2	14	17
Kingston.....	1	5	6
Victoria.....	3	3
	8(b)	5	88	101

(a) Employed in Divisional Headquarters Office.

(b) The 8 officers employed with Instructional Cadre are borne on Regimental Establishment.

